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  I 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper, as it’s titled, is about risk management in investment banks. To put it more 
broadly, we try to illustrate to what extent the traditional risk management approaches 
could work in the modern financial world along with the expansion of financial 
derivatives, tools and activities. We take the American financial market and step into the 
topic by the case analysis on Lehman Brothers and Goldman Sachs. Besides, we explain 
the other relevant concepts and players such as short selling and credit rating for further 
research as well as to help delineating the whole profile of the financial environment, so 
readers could probably know what was going on underlying the problem area. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Problem Area 
 
In the fall of 2008, America suffered a severe economic collapse, which was triggered by 
the increasingly serious financial crisis. After the 9.11 attacks and the bubble of the 
Nasdaq stock market burst, the Federal Reserve System (Fed) took a complete loose 
monetary policy in order to reduce the bad impact on the economy, and to prevent the 
recession of the country.1 As a result, home loan issuers and banks began making 
various residential mortgage products to allow subprime credit borrowers entering the 
real estate market. 
 
In order to ‘make home loans sales more efficient and profitable’2, banks began 
securitizing the capital and loans. The securities then formed a shell corporation or trust 
to hold the loan pool and use the mortgage revenue stream to support the creation of 
bonds which made payments to investors over time. ‘Those bonds which are registered 
in the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) are called Residential Mortgage Backed 
Securities (RMBS) and they are typically sold to public investors’.3 
 
However since 2006, the mortgage-related securities started to devaluate and many 
investors have to hold unmarketable RMBS with a keep-falling price.4 A tragedy 
irresistible occurred which is later known as the Financial Crisis. 
 
The panic market infected its main players like the investment banks. Lehman Brothers 
                                                             
1 Makinen, 2002, p.10-11 
2 Levin & Coburn, 2011, p.18 
3 Levin & Coburn, 2011 
4 Levin & Coburn, 2011, p.6 
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who invested a lot in subprime-related loans started to vibrate. Short after, the security 
market collapsed and the subprime risk became avoidless. Although the firm continued 
their strategy on seizing market shares since they believed the situation would not 
become irredeemable, the market and the government finally lost confidence and no 
longer supported them. Unfortunately, they had to go bankrupted. 5  Conversely, 
another investment bank, Goldman Sachs survived from the crisis. 
 
According to the experiences of the two companies, we intend to investigate the 
potential causal connection between their different risk management strategies and the 
different destinies. 
 
 
1.2 Problem Formulation 
 
To what extent could modern investment banks manage risks to counteract financial 
crisis impact in the United States? 
 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
a. How had the business areas of the investment banks developed during the latest 
decades in the U.S.? 
In this part, we can mainly focus on the development of investment banks in the 20th 
century. The expansion of their business areas made a chain reaction which led to the 
later economic boom and the financial crisis. 
 
b. How was the economic situation in the early 2000s in the U.S.? 
                                                             
5 Norberg, 2009 
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Following the first guideline, we could illustrate the profile of the economy trends in the 
U.S. in the early 2000s, followed by the Fed’s response to the situation, for instance, the 
measures they placed to stimulate the slack economy. 
 
c. What stimulated the fast growth of the subprime mortgage market in the early 
2000s? 
This question will lead us to look into the roots on how investment banks could loosen 
the requirements to make loans for people who had got a subprime credit rating. The 
answer may help to dig out the big trap covered by the prosperity economy. 
 
d. What was the role of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) in the mortgage market in the 
U.S.? 
The research on this question could help us to explain how investment banks could get a 
high credit rating of the large amount of subprime mortgage securities they issued, 
which actually stimulated the rapid growth of the subprime mortgage market in the U.S. 
 
e. How come did the credit ratings of many mortgage related securities started to fall 
since 2006? 
We would like to investigate how investment banks used mortgage securities which 
magnified the risks of the financial market. In addition, we can describe the 
development of the mortgage related securities till its depreciation in around 2006. 
 
f. What was the influence(s) of the credit downgrade? 
The credit ratings had been appraised in different grades which could influence the 
mortgage-related securities market. Since the boom bubble burst was tightly combined 
with the credit downgrade, we would like to explain it as one of the reasons of the cause 
of the financial crisis. 
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g. How did it finally become the financial crisis (subprime mortgage crisis) as we 
know today? 
We would like to define the same financial environment for Lehman Brothers and 
Goldman Sachs who made fully use of the credit downgrade. At the same time, we can 
better investigate different strategies the two investment banks took during the period 
from credit downgrade to financial crisis. 
 
h. How did the investment banks such as Lehman Brothers and Goldman Sachs react 
on the crisis? 
Searching for the reactions can lead us to understand the different results of the two 
enterprises which were principally caused by the different risk management 
approaches. 
 
i. To what degree could we compare them from the risk management perspective? 
Risk management is the mainly theoretical approach we use in this project. We would 
like to consider it as a main aspect which led to the different destinies of the two 
companies. The more deep we recognize the more profound effect we could find about 
its impact on the enterprises. 
 
j. What can we learn from Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy? 
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy consisted of several reasons. Our project will focus on 
their managerial strategies especially how the enterprises identified, assessed and 
responded to the financial risks. 
 
k. How should we evaluate the strategic approaches of Goldman Sachs in dodging 
risks? 
This question will be focused on in the discussion. The main concern is to describe to 
what extent we could encourage Goldman Sachs or similar institutions to implement the 
Introduction 
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same kind of strategies counteracting to crisis. Or whether could we say that the 
strategies themselves actually led to the crisis and would lead to crisis in the future. 
 
The research questions will help our writing and lead the empirical chapters primarily as 
the guideline. We will follow the logic, trying to trace from the general background and 
environment to the specific case description and analysis which would at the end help 
us answer the problem formulation. 
 
 
1.4 Related Concepts 
 
Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) 
‘It is an investment-grade security backed by bonds, loans and other assets. CDOs 
represent different types of debt and credit risk. The higher the risk is, the more the 
CDO pays’.6 In our project, we look at CDOs backed by the varieties of financial 
derivatives such as the RMBS and etc. 
 
Credit Default Swap (CDS) 
‘It is a swap designed to transfer the credit exposure of fixed income products between 
parties’. Traditional insurance policy where a buyer receives from the seller guarantees 
of the credit worthiness of the product.7 
 
Credit Rating 
It is the ‘rating that estimates the credit worthiness of individuals and corporations. It is 
based upon the history of borrowing and repayment, as well as the availability of assets 
and extent of liabilities’.8 Those ones who issue ratings are known as Credit Rating 
                                                             
6 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cdo.asp#ixzz1c6Ja2d6B 
7 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/creditdefaultswap.asp#ixzz1c6JHULyd 
8 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/creditrating.asp#ixzz1c6HT0IlT 
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Agencies (CRAs). 
 
Financial Crisis 
‘A financial crisis can come as a result of institutions or assets being overvalued, and can 
be exacerbated by investor behavior. A rapid string of sell offs can further result in lower 
asset prices or more savings withdrawals. If left unchecked, the crisis can cause the 
economy to go into a recession or depression’9 Of course financial crisis has occurred 
many times along the history. However in this project, we indicate the subprime crisis 
occurred in 2006 which is still touching us to the quick today. 
 
Investment Bank 
A financial institution which performs a variety of services, including ‘underwriting, 
acting as an intermediary between an issuer of securities and the investing public, 
facilitating mergers and other corporate reorganizations, and also acting as a broker for 
institutional clients.’10 
 
Short Selling 
‘Short sale is the sale of a security that isn't owned by the seller, but that is promised to 
be delivered. Shorting is when an investor makes money only when a shorted security 
falls in value’.11 
 
Subprime Loan 
It is a type of loan that is offered to individuals with a low credit rating (or other factors 
indicating that a borrower may have a chance of evading on the debt repayments) that 
are not qualified for prime rate loans. Subprime loans incline higher interest rates as 
opposed to prime rate offered on traditional loans.12 Subprime loans may exist in many 
                                                             
9 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financial-crisis.asp#axzz1fCNGUSvr 
10 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/investmentbank.asp#axzz1fCNGUSvr  
11 http://www.investopedia.com/university/shortselling/shortselling1.asp#ixzz1c6Ia908J 
12 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/subprimeloan.asp#ixzz1c6HAf2Wv 
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kinds, for instance, Residential Mortgage Loans (RMLs) in our project. 
 
 
1.5 Motivation 
 
Financial crises had impacted most of the country’s economy in a negative way. It is a 
kind of economic crises that the world had recently suffered. It is like deadly bacteria 
that causes a deadly plague.  
 
We want to investigate the causes of inadequacies within the financial sector of two key 
actors of our project Leman Brothers and Goldman Sachs. As we believe there is a great 
complexity hidden behind the surface.  
 
With this in mind the grand goal of our project is firstly to attempt to recognize the 
weaknesses and strengths within the risk management perspectives of two companies. 
We will also attempt to apply portfolio theory in order to provide the tools necessary to 
address the mentioned problems. Secondly, we wish to further the knowledge in this 
academic area by investigating the character and background of the problem. 
 
We want to gain knowledge in this field but also to instigate some sort of a change in 
the society. We believe that academic studies should aim to improve society as oppose 
to simply acquiring knowledge for the sake of the knowledge. 
 
 
1.6 Limitation 
 
It is important when doing a research project of this kind to keep in mind the 
unavoidable limitations that our project shall face. 
Introduction 
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We will call them the procedural limitations that have to do with practical issues of our 
project. One of the limitations in our project is the time-frame, where in our case we 
choose to look at the years 2000-2008 mainly. Another limitation is that we have chosen 
two companies with the relevantly the same size within the similar industry. 
 
Our academic limitation is that our approach will make it hard to test our results 
afterwards and thus it will be more of a theoretical project rather than a practical one. 
We will not be able to go to the U.S. and conduct an interview with representatives of 
the companies. 
 
Our resource limitation is about a process of obtaining our empirical material. We will 
be using academic published books, e-books and scientific articles. We will not be able 
to travel long distances (with it spend our time and money), but we will have to spend it 
by gathering our empirical materials. Our form of approach is a case study, where the 
theories could be applied successfully. 
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2. Theories 
 
 
2.1 Risk Management 
 
Here we take the risk management theories from both of the project management and 
the financial management frameworks. We believe it is reasonable to choose also the 
project management as the Risk Response Approaches here, since we find the theory 
quite relevant and helpful to our empirical research. Concretely, when we analyze the 
cases, we would describe the company’s decision making process which was very much 
related on their project chosen; in another word, their directions of investment 
strategies by which they believed would bring profits to them. 
 
 
2.1.1 Risk Response Approaches 
 
Clifford F. Gray and Erik W. Larson are professors specializing in project management, 
marketing and international business at the College of Business, Oregon State University. 
They wrote the famous book ‘Project Management: The Managerial Process’ which now 
has got many editions. 
 
According to them, risks are inherent in any project, and risk management is considered 
to be the essence of project management.13 They outlined four steps as the process 
regarding risk management, which are risk identification, risk assessment, risk response 
development and risk response control.14 Each of them is very important and can be 
broken down into sub steps. 
                                                             
13 Gray & Larson, 2006, p.207, 229 
14 Gray & Larson, 2006, p.209 
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1. Risk Identification ? Analyze the project to identify sources of risk 
2. Risk Assessment ? Severity of impact 
? Likelihood of occurring 
? Controllability 
3. Risk Response ? Develop a strategy to reduce possible damage 
? Develop contingency plans 
4. Risk Response Control ? Implement risk strategy 
? Monitor and adjust plan for new risks 
? Change management 
(Source: Gray & Larson, 2006, p.209) 
 
In our project, we will mainly focus on the third step about how manager could reduce 
or dodge risk damage from a theoretical method perspective. 
 
Gray and Larson describe that there are several ways to reduce damage of the risks 
identified. They are Mitigating Risk, Avoiding Risk, Transferring Risk, Sharing Risk and 
Retaining Risk.15 
 
Mitigating Risk 1. To reduce the like hood that the event will occur 
2. To reduce the impact that the adverse event would have on 
the project 
Avoiding Risk To change the project plan to eliminate the risk or condition 
Transferring Risk 1. To transfer risks from the owner to another party, like a 
contractor 
2. To pay a premium – using insurance 
3. To use other financial instruments, such as performance 
bonds, warranties, guarantees… 
Sharing Risk To allocate proportions of risk to different parties 
Retaining Risk To accept the risk, since it is too large to transfer or reduce the 
event 
                                                             
15 Gray & Larson, 2006, p.215-217 
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(made by the group according to Gray & Larson, 2006, p.215-217) 
 
According to the table, we can learn that there are several ways to cope with risks with 
different levels. Some risks are possible to avoid while others are not. In order to 
mitigate the influence of a risk, it can either be accepted after reducing the impact, or 
be transferred to another party in a certain degree.  
 
In the financial institutions nowadays, risk is even considered as an opportunity for 
making money sometimes if you can accurately predict its happening.16 For instance, 
the short selling especially the naked shorting selling and the use of CDS make it 
possible to profit from risk – the higher the risk is, the more money you can earn. 
Mitigating and avoiding risk explain the interaction between risk and its accepter as a 
dualistic relationship, while transferring and sharing risk both bring third party in. 
Sharing risk is interesting since the ‘different parties’ here can be either insider or 
outsider based on our understanding. A use of outsider could be seen as partly 
transferring risk. And a use of insider could be the allocation of risks between different 
departments. It could also be a portfolio of similar or dissimilar investments.17 
 
 
2.1.2 Rational Behaviour in Financial Institutions 
 
Firstly, human beings are assumed to be rational. Regarding financial institution as a 
group, the main expectation would be to maximize net return while balancing risks at 
the same time. However, an individual’s rationality would be to maximize his/her own 
income or bonus. This could be a conflict for financial institutions. As a result, the role of 
risk management in financial institutions is raised up to a conspicuous stage. 
 
                                                             
16 See also the principles on short selling and financial insurance 
17 See also portfolio theory for more 
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Dr. Grinsven, who works in the professional services industry helping financial 
institutions solving complex risk management problems, defined the guidelines for the 
way of thinking and working in financial institutions. According to him, risk management 
must be approached based on ‘procedural rationality’. It means that ‘decision makers 
(managers) must be able to make decisions as rationally as possible’ based on the 
‘judgments of experts’.18 
 
Since there is an inconsistency between individual benefit and group benefit, it brings 
manager’s significance to the fore that he/her as individual has to be accountable for 
the organization’s decision making in most cases. As Grinsven states, ‘Too often 
responsibilities are blamed on multiple persons so no individual can be held 
responsible’.19 In order to define the responsibilities on risk management, a financial 
institution should be proactive to divide the roles among different hierarchies from the 
key managers to the specialized department in managing risks. This could also be helpful 
for the team to fast realize and react on risks or potential risks. 
 
 
2.1.3 Risk Management Players 
 
Contrast to rationality as a way of thinking, Greuning & Bratanovic defined that there 
are objectively three types of key players involved in risk management: systemic players, 
institutional players and external players.20 
 
Systemic Players 1. Legal and Regulatory Authorities 
2. Supervisors 
Institutional Players 1. Shareholders 
2. Board of Directors 
                                                             
18 Grinsven, 2010, p.4 & Grinsven, 2009, p.66-67 
19 Grinsven, 2010, p.5 & Grinsven, 2009, p.72 
20 Greuning & Bratanovic, 2009, p.43 
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3. Executive Management 
4. Audit Committee / Internal Audit 
External Players 1. External Auditors 
2. Outside stakeholders / Public 
(made by the group according to Greuning & Bratanovic, 2009, p.43) 
 
Among these, Institutional players are most directly relevant, and from where board of 
directors and executive management are at the most critical and important level.21 
Board of directors is responsible to ‘set policies, monitor effects and approve any 
changes’, while executive management is in charge of ‘implementing polices and 
strategies, and managing day-to-day operations’.22 
 
This can also be correlated to Grinsven’s perspective on the rational behaviour in 
financial institutions. It seems to be contradicted that Greuning & Bratanovic encourage 
a pro-perfect institutional functions in risk management; however, Grinsven prefers to 
consider human beings to be too rational to act consistently in, for instance, managing 
risks. 
 
 
2.1.4 Subprime Risks 
 
Petersen et al defined that the main risks for dealing with subprime mortgage securities 
include credit, market, operational, tranching and systemic risks.23 They each can be 
subdivided into categories. 
 
Overview of Subprime Risks 
Credit Risk ----------> Counterparty Risk 
                                                             
21 Greuning & Bratanovic, 2009, p.43 
22 Greuning & Bratanovic, 2009, p.43 
23 Petersen et al., 2011, p.435 
Theories 
 14 / 53 
Default Risk 
Market Risk ---------> Interest Rate Risk --------> Basis Risk 
Prepayment Risk 
Price Risk -----------> Investment Risk 
Re-investment Risk 
Liquidity Risk -----------> Funding Risk 
Credit Crunch Risk 
Operational Risk ------> House Appraisal Risk 
Valuation Risk 
Compensation Risk 
Tranching Risk ---------> Maturity Mismatch Risk 
Synthetic Risk 
Systemic Risk ----------> Maturity Transformation Risk 
(made by the group according to Petersen et al., 2011, p.435) 
 
Credit risk here results from the security originators who are unable to make ‘scheduled 
payment’, or a banking agent who does not ‘pay out on a bond, credit derivative or 
credit insurance contract’.24  
 
Market risk initiates when the value the mortgage portfolio declines because of the 
changes in securities prices or interest rates.25 Here the liquidity risk refers to the 
situation when an agent cannot sell its mortgage products since nobody is willing to buy. 
As a result, funding risk arises when the agent lacks enough funds to refinance the loans; 
and credit crunch risk arises when the agent is hard to get loan supplied from other 
lenders since its credit rating has been downgraded.26 
 
Operational risk refers to the losses caused by ‘insufficient or inadequate procedures, 
processes, systems or improper actions taken’. 27  It involves ‘documentation, 
                                                             
24 Petersen et al., 2011, p.435 
25 Petersen et al., 2011, p.435 
26 Petersen et al., 2011, p.436 
27 Petersen et al., 2011, p.436 
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background checks and the integrity of loan process.’28 
 
Tranching risk in our case is mainly embedded in synthetic risk with the intricacy of 
subprime mortgage products being considered. Synthetic risk ‘can be traded via credit 
derivatives – like credit default swaps (CDSs)’ which refer to individual subprime 
mortgage securities, or synthetic CDOs.29 
 
In our case analysis, most listed risks will be quite relevant especially market, 
operational and systemic risks. 
 
 
2.2 Portfolio Theory 
 
Portfolio is a mixture of securities with a dissimilar risk-return features that establish the 
portfolio of the investor. Portfolio may include various assets or instruments of 
investment. ‘The portfolio is also built up out of the wealth or income of the investor 
over a period of time, with a view to suit his risk or return preferences to that of the 
portfolio that he holds’.30 
 
Portfolio is a mix of assets which are held by investors. ‘The traditional Portfolio Theory 
aims at the selection of such securities that would fit in well with the asset preferences, 
needs and choices of the investor’31. For example, a retired executive will more likely 
invest his or her money into a fixed income security with a fixed return. As for the 
younger generation for example, young aggressive investor he will invest in a new 
companies with a higher risky ventures. ‘Modern Portfolio Theory postulates that 
maximization of return and/or minimization of risk will yield optimal returns and the 
                                                             
28 Petersen et al., 2011, p.436 
29 Petersen et al., 2011, p.436-437 
30 Avadhani, 2009, p.2 
31 Avadhani, 2009, p.3 
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choice and attitudes of investors are only a starting point for investment decision and 
that vigorous risk return analysis is necessary for optimization of returns’.32 
 
Most of the investors are keen towards two factors which is a risk and reward 
opportunities. ‘The qualification of risk and the need for optimization of return with 
lowest risk are the contributions of Markowitz. This led to what is called the Modern 
Portfolio Theory, which emphasizes the tradeoff between risk and return’33. Meaning 
that there is a high risk factor associated with the higher return where investors prefer 
high return but low risk and therefore the need for a tradeoff. It is surely an individual 
preference of an investor to decide where to invest their money, and surely that is also 
depends on investors’ wealth, income and preferences. ‘The risk of each security is 
different from that of others and by a proper combination of securities, called 
diversification, one can arrive at a combination wherein the risk of one is offset partly or 
fully by that of the other. In other words, the variability of each security and covariance 
for their returns reflected through their inter-relationships should be taken into 
account’.34 
 
In modern portfolio theory, there are a lot of considerations that supposed to be taken 
into account such as: expected return, variances and covariance of the return of the 
securities within the portfolio must be taken into consideration when choosing a 
portfolio. The efficient portfolio is interconnected with the highest return for the lowest 
risk or a given level of risk.35 
 
The fundamental point about Portfolio Theory is that there is always a risk factor within 
portfolio of shares where unsystematic risk is reduced through diversification.  
‘Different shares have different degrees of sensitivity to the systematic risk element. The 
                                                             
32 Avadhani, 2009, p.3 
33 Avadhani, 2009, p.446-447 
34 Avadhani, 2009, p.446-447 
35 Avadhani, 2009, p 446-447 
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risk of securities (for example shares) has two elements: 
1. Unsystematic risk of factors specific to firms which can be diversified away. 
2. Systematic risk (economic growth movements, inflation and exchange rate 
changes) caused by risk factors common to all firms.’36 
 
 
(Source: Arnold, 2007, p.171) 
 
 
2.3 Credit Rating Method and Conflict 
 
In the U.S., the origin of credit rating agency can be traced back to one hundred years 
ago, and later they were nationally defined in 1975.37 Generally speaking, credit rating 
agencies profit by doing analysis for investors, and now more by issuing ratings for the 
bond and the bond issuers.38 Due to the development the rating agencies and the 
recent financial crisis, a number of problems are exposed in this business. According to 
McCleskey who is professional in the American financial systems and institutional 
studies, there are some problems or conflicts in the rating process which are known as 
the Data-based Method and the Issuer-pays Model. 
                                                             
36 Arnold, 2007, p.170, 171, 179 
37 Abdelal, 2007, p.166-168 
38 Abdelal, 2007, p.164 
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Data-based Method 
 
The methodology of the credit rating process is the first thing the scholar criticizes on. A 
credit analyst or rater very much relies on historical data in order to predict the future 
tendencies. This leads to a list of problems, first of which is that the financial products 
update very fast, therefore the performance history of such products could be very 
short, like subprime mortgages.39 Secondly, a rating shows the opinion of the likelihood 
that a bond would go into default, so to speak, it is just about probabilities.40 When 
talking about probability, it is like the bell curve that the middle fat parts are the most 
probable to occur, and the tails are very much ignored, since they rarely happen. The 
problem is that even though the tail rarely happens, it happens even it is once per one 
hundred years. If it happens, the influence is like earthquake or volcanic eruption, and 
worse, the rating does not tell it. However, warnings do exist from both inside and 
outside evaluators, but they would be easily ignored by the agencies. 
 
Issuer-pays Model41 
 
In theory, a good quality of a product should be an accurate rating referring to CRAs. 
This means that the agency who can issue the most accurate rating would win the 
business. But the problem is that the issuers of the securities choose the agency and pay 
for the ratings, and they of course want to have a high rating. As a result, the issuers 
choose the agency who gives the highest rating rather than who gives the most accurate 
rating. This is what is said, the issuer-pays model.42 
 
                                                             
39 McCleskey, 2010, p.86 & SEC, 2008 
40 McCleskey, 2010, p.86 
41 McCleskey, 2010, p.85, 89-92 & Levin & Coburn, 2011, p.31 & Davies, 2010, p.124-126 & Goodhart, 2010, 
p.169-170 
42 McCleskey, 2010, p.85 
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McCleskey describes two kinds of bonds to which ratings are issued. One is Corporate 
and Municipal Bond and the other one is Structured Financial Bond. They both cannot 
get rid of the issuer-pays model.43 
 
The former one is usually issued companies or government bodies. This kind of bonds 
will normally be assigned to an analyst and be analyzed by ‘the methodology developed 
for the industry in which the issuer operates’.44 After that, the analyst presents his or 
her views to a rating committee and it is a group work for finally deciding the rating 
issued rather than an individual work. This could be a good approach to get rid of the 
issuer-pays impact, since the analysts as well as most of the committee ‘has no revenue 
goal that might be affected by an angry issuer’.45 However, McCleskey still mentions 
that if the upper-level supervisor has any ‘market share goals as part of their bonus 
scheme and performance evaluations’, the effect of the committee decision-making 
process would be diminished.46 
 
Structured financial bonds are more complicated but more directly relevant to the 
issuer-pays model. Structured finance products are created with special purpose 
implicated such as a RMBS which involved a number of mortgage related bonds. And 
they are usually ‘still on the drawing board when…(being) presented to the rating 
agencies’.47 This means that there could be an arranger of the product who strategically 
changes the portfolio in the security in order to meet certain characteristics, such as a 
credit score. In this scenario, problem arises if the arranger of the bond approaches 
more than one rating agencies. Since only one rating is needed, the arranger will 
definitely choose the highest rating and the rater therefore get the fee.48 
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The conflicts in the credit rating process lead to a lot of introspection among investors 
and government regulators. An alternative model which is already applied in few small 
agencies is the user-pays model. However, there are also some conflicts in this model. 
For instance, an agency gives a high rating of a bond, and this brings investors 
confidence to buy it. What if the agency downgrades the rating subsequently? Another 
model suggests to nationalize the rating agencies and to put the fees under government 
budget. However, this also has its own limits. To what degree the rating agencies are 
utility that all citizens have to pay for their service.49 
 
 
2.4 Summary 
 
With regard to the analysis and the case study, we would like to introduce the empirical 
practices relating to the theories applied which will be further presented in the project. 
 
Firstly, portfolio theory is regarded it as the stepping-stone theory to the further analysis; 
so to speak, this theory is an important one to the background and the case analysis. It 
indicates the tendency of the development of the American financial institutions which 
formed the portfolio strategic habits of the investment banks like Lehman Brothers and 
Goldman Sachs. The same contents refer to risk management to a big extent as well. For 
example, the Risk Management Players shows us the duties of every member in the 
organizational hierarchies on account of managing risks from a theoretical perspective. 
Subprime risks which were actually ignored or underestimated by many investors 
describe a certain financial environment that the investment banks should have paid 
attention to. 
 
Following that, risk management is also applied in the further analysis and the case 
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study. Risk Response Approaches deals with the risk management strategies Goldman 
Sachs implemented. For example, to short sell and to use CDS correlated to the issued 
CDOs can be very much explained by sharing or transferring risks. Rational Behaviour 
from another side explains why Lehman Brothers failed in mitigating or retaining risks. 
 
Besides, we also have an introduction on the method and the conflict in CRAs. It is 
actually quite relevant in explaining why people delayed to get prepared while the 
financial crisis occurred. We believe that the critics on CRAs are not fewer than that on 
investment banks. However, CRA is not the main topic discussed in the project, so we 
are not going into details on its effect. 
 
Below, it is the general conclusion on how we will use the theories concerning the 
empirical analysis. Please note that there were of course many theoretical reasons for 
the cause of the financial crisis and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and so on. Due 
to the limitations, we would not be able to go into details of all the relevance, nor get all 
the materials we hope to. Thus, we choose to enrich our knowledge in this topic by the 
main academic area of risk management and the empirical studies on the investment 
banks. Simultaneously, we have to leave other perspectives as limitations of this project. 
 
 
Risk Response Approaches ? Risk management development in financial institutions 
? Short selling and CDS 
? Lehman and Goldman’s cases in risk management 
Rational Behaviour ? Lehman – failure in managing risks 
? Goldman – critics on its risk management strategies 
Risk Management Players ? Risk management development in financial institutions 
Subprime Risks ? Development in subprime products and investment 
? Risks in subprime-related business for investment 
banks, especially Lehman 
Portfolio Theory ? Financial market development and product variety 
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? CDOs creation 
? CDS and systematic risk 
? Lehman’s subprime investment 
? Goldman’s use of CDOs 
Credit Rating Method and 
Conflict 
? The failure of CRAs as ‘warning system’ 
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3. Methodology 
 
 
This chapter is mainly concerned with methodological considerations, where our choice 
of theories, research strategy and methods of empirical research will be elaborated. Our 
research study is in the form of case study. We will be concentrating toward ‘the 
collective case study where a number of cases are studied in order to investigate some 
general phenomenon’.50 We choose an inductive approach, where ‘our inductive 
reasoning works moving from specific observations to broader generalizations and 
theories ‘bottom-up approach’51 we begin with specific observation, by gathering as 
much as possible empirical data with it getting the knowledge, after we identify patterns 
and formulate tentative hypothesis and finding the relevant theories. According to 
Philosophy of Social Science, this section also includes ontology and epistemology, 
which are derived from theories. 
 
 
3.1 Theoretical Approach 
 
Firstly, we define that our project is based on risk management as the main analytical 
angle, according to the problem formulation. Therefore, we choose concepts useful for 
us primarily from the certain aspect in risk management, which builds our theoretical 
approach from an interdisciplinary perspective. That is to say, we define risk 
management as an interdisciplinary approach in our project containing several listed 
concepts relevant to our study area. 
 
Rational behaviour and risk management players are very much related. The latter one 
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from an optimal and overall aspect considers everyone in an organization to be 
responsible to risk management with their different positions and duties involved. While 
rational behaviour, as it is named, tends to look at risk management from a rational way 
– that is, every individual is rational. Individual employee may work for his/her own 
salary and bonus, therefore risks are easily ignored. And this lights up manager’s 
responsibility in risk management. That is to say, the manager is significant in controlling 
risks for the whole corporate. In another way, to make everyone take responsibility in 
controlling risks might be an extravagant hope, rationally speaking. This contributes to 
our project very much since it indicates a hidden danger in financial institutions like the 
investment banks in our case. 
 
Subprime risks demonstrate the risks in subprime related projects. Risk response 
approaches provide us several ways to control risks which are quite helpful for our case 
analysis. Portfolio theory also shows us a way to control (minimize) risk, which is 
described as investment diversification. 
 
The above ones could be integrated as risk-related perspectives. We also define Credit 
Rating as concept clarification in a critical way. We do so because the concepts are very 
important in the case analysis. Thus, to understand their principles and how they work 
are quite necessary to continue our project. Although investment banks are the main 
case we choose, CRAs as well played a remarkable role during the whole contemporary, 
and their significance could probably form the limitation of our project and stimulate 
the further research. 
 
 
3.2 Data Selection 
 
Our data selection is influenced by the limitation as mentioned, that we are not able to 
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go to the U.S. to do interviews or surveys. Instead, we primarily use secondary materials, 
so as to say, books, journals, articles and so on. The materials we choose, especially 
those related to the studies on the financial crisis, were mostly published after 2008, so 
to have a quite contemporary view. 
 
As well as the theories, the empirical materials we choose are mostly produced by 
American scholars and institutions, and published by American publishers. So we could 
expect that the point of views are pro-American, directly related to the origin of our 
research topic. We look into research results from multiple perspectives while not all of 
them would be used in the same extent. In another word, researchers are professional 
in different subjects and tend to analyze the crisis from different aspects. Insofar as we 
take risk management as our main theoretical approach, we will select materials 
supporting our perspective on studying the cases. 
 
In the background description and case studies, we primarily take resources from 
secondary materials, such as academic books and research papers. They are mostly 
based on interviews with numerous traders, investment bankers, risk managers, 
corporate executives, and so on. Some examine key market conditions such as the 
market development, the uncertainty, and the risk factors of the crisis. And some also 
explain the remarkable events in today’s global economy, illustrating the global 
economic crisis as the background. 
 
With regard to Lehman Brothers, several academic books have been identified which try 
to answer the question why the company failed. The research paper by Feng and 
Fredriksson for instance, gives us more in-depth view of the risks type in Lehman 
Brothers and their risk management approaches. It examined five different types of risks 
in Lehman Brothers, and also mentioned their negligence that led to the bankruptcy. 
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For Goldman Sachs, the main secondary data we use is the report by Carl Levin, the 
Chairman and Tom Coburn, the Ranking Minority Member from the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate. It is an up-to-date 
authorized report on an overall anatomy of the financial collapse, from the germination 
to the maturation. The research on Goldman Sachs is quite detailed, based on different 
departmental functions, the role of the mortgage desk, and as well describes their uses 
of each important CDO they created, etc.  
 
Anyhow, we believe that the secondary data we use for case analysis are sufficiently 
reliable, academical and authorized. And we will summarize our studies on the cases by 
our own words and understandings. 
 
If without regard to the limitations, for instance on scheduling, we could be able to 
interview some employee or manager in a Danish financial institution who might be 
involved in the same situation during the financial crisis and probably has some good 
considerations on the topic. 
 
 
3.3 Ontology 
 
In this project we work with ontology of objectivism. This means that we assume that 
reality exists independently of social actors. ‘Objectivists believe that reality exists 
independently of those who live in it,…people react to what is happening around them 
in predictable ways because their behaviour is part of the material world in which they 
live and is determined by causes, just as is the behavior of matter’.52 
 
With it we are able to discuss organizations in our case by focusing towards two main 
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actors in our project - two investment banks Lehman brothers and Goldman Sachs 
during financial crises times in United States. 
 
 
3.4 Epistemology 
 
The epistemology, the means by which we can obtain knowledge, is in this project 
Critical Realism. ‘…realists hold that an external reality which is independent of human 
consciousness exists and can nevertheless be known’.53 
 
‘For critical realism, there is a basic distinction to be drawn between our knowledge of 
the world and the reality of the social world.’54 The world is changing and therefore the 
description of something will never be the same. While reality is objective and the truth 
is one, the tools for explaining and understanding this truth are based on the context of 
research and the values of the researcher meaning that it is the researcher’s willingness 
to actualize his view on the world when the new information is obtained. 
 
By gaining the knowledge that had been strived and based on the facts we will be able 
to provide the basis of investigating the risk management strategies that Lehman 
brothers and Goldman Sachs had been using during financial crisis. We will observe the 
reality on the surface of describing the risk management theory and portfolio theory 
that will give us reasons to understand how these investment banks counteract the 
financial crises in United States.  
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4. Background Descriptions 
 
 
In order to clarify the situation, we will introduce the background of the problem as well 
as the key factors prior to the case study and the discussion. In this chapter we will be 
rather descriptive than analytic. 
 
 
4.1 Financial Surroundings 
 
Before the case studies, it's necessary to get hold of the historical background of the 
investment banking industry. Historically, there were commercial banks and investment 
banks in America. Both of them contributed the boom of the national economy.55 
 
At the beginning, investment banks served as financial brokerage, transferring capitals 
from possessors to debtors. Later, it also started to help the riches, corporations and 
even governments ‘sell their new securities (equity or debt) to finance capital needs’56 
which was called underwriting. The services also included ‘advising on mergers and 
acquisitions, consulting, merchant banking, and developing new financial products 
including derivatives such as mortgage-backed securities’.57 The nature of investment 
banking decided that the institutions must have the abilities to keep market confidence 
and to create attractive securities for customers. From another side, their business 
activities also pushed capital holders and institutional investors to a certain level of risk 
which might ensure profit return.58 
 
                                                             
55 Williams, 2010, p.31 
56 Williams, 2010, p.32 
57 Williams, 2010, p.32 
58 Williams, 2010, p.33 
Background Descriptions 
 29 / 53 
After the 1929 economic crash, the American government made a series of policies to 
prevent the economy from exacerbating. A well-known policy was the Glass-Steagall Act 
which separated the activities of investment banks and commercial banks. Besides, the 
banks’ managers also paid more attention to the credit ratings which started to be an 
important investment tool.59 The new policies led the economy to a fast growing period 
after the 1929 crash. 
 
Since the 1960s, commercial banks began to lobby Congress in order to enter the 
underwriting business. However until 1986, the Fed finally modified the Glass-Steagall 
Act and permitted commercial banks to engage in the investment banks’ activities. 
Along with the flow of the commercial banks’ requests, on September 23, 1999, the 
merger of Citicorp became the last straw to crush the Glass-Steagall Act. And a new 
policy the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was passed, allowing companies which held 
commercial banks already to own investment banks at the same time.60 This situation 
had been one of the contributions to the new Wall Street tradition. 
 
Since the early 2000s, the Fed began to lower the interest rating and take a completely 
loosen monetary policy. More people were therefore able to borrow money for house 
loans. Banks were also more motivated to let subprime borrowers enter the market 
since they smelt more profits.61 Thereby, the subprime mortgage related securities 
were issued, rated and then sold to individual investors like the rich people and 
institutional investors like hedge funds and pension funds etc. With the low interest rate, 
the lax monetary policy and the various financial derivatives, the housing price rose 
rapidly in the early 2000s. Although the subprime credit borrowers were more likely to 
default, the risk was ignored because of the growing housing price.62 
 
                                                             
59 Williams, 2010, p.39-40 
60 Williams, 2010, p.42-44 
61 Makinen, 2002, p.10-11 
62 Williams, 2010, p.118-121 
Background Descriptions 
 30 / 53 
However, the amount of the subprime borrowers was too large which had magnified the 
risk of the mortgage related securities. The loan issuers were too optimistic on the 
housing prices and they let too many subprime borrowers enter the market. This led to 
an uncontrollable credit and liquid risk when the housing prices no longer increased. 
Also, the investment banks securitized many subprime loans and mortgage backed CDOs, 
and sold them to the investors, which magnified the market risk and led to a whole 
systemic risk in the end. We can see that investment banks intended to make more 
profits but ignored the higher level of risk. From 2001 to 2006, more than 75 percent of 
the subprime home loans had been securitized and packaged for their customers. ‘As a 
percentage of all the home loans, the subprime ones had risen from 7% to 14%’.63 
 
After several years’ housing bubble, the housing prices began to fall when the Fed raised 
the interest rates and decided to tighten the monetary policy, in order to restrain the 
overheated economy. Consequently, the defaults started – more and more subprime 
credit borrowers could not payback the home loans triggered by the relative higher 
interest rates.64 At the beginning, people did not pay much attention to the defaults 
until the scale expanded largely in a short time. It was like the pyramid – the low income 
borrowers, at the bottom of the lending chain, failed to meet their payments, and the 
liquid risk came into play. As a result, those home loan companies could not get money 
back for turnover and they lost credit from their clients. They could sell the mortgaged 
products like the houses; however, the prices kept falling. In February 2007, the largest 
subprime lender, Countrywide Financial Corp reduced their lending scale. Another big 
lender, New Century published financial profit warning around the same time, but it was 
too late. On April 4th 2007, New Century closed its door.65 
 
The mortgage backed securities like the RMBSs were rated from a high level to a junk 
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one shortly and they fast lost their values. The relevant CDOs went synchronously and 
the investors thus lost most of their money. Most investment banks were stuck by their 
unsold devaluating CDOs and suffered liquid risk.66 The financial insurers such as those 
who provided CDS also had a suffering time, and finally had to be taken over by the 
government. Although the Fed tried to save the situation, the systemic risk had reached 
a degree which was not easy to change. 
 
Until 2008, Lehman Brothers had gone bankrupt, Bear Stearns had been taken over by 
JPMorgan, Merrill Lynch had been rescued by the Bank of America and American 
International Group (AIG) had been taken over by the American government. 67 
Goldman Sachs, however, went through the test and even made a lot of money, but the 
company’s reputation was then seriously shocked. There was no real winner in this 
game. 
 
 
4.2 Credit Rating Agency (CRA) 
 
‘A credit rating is an assessment of the likelihood that a particular 
financial instrument, such as a corporate bond or mortgage backed 
security, may default or incur losses. A high credit rating indicates that a 
debt instrument is expected to be repaid and so qualifies as a safe 
investment.’68 
 
In the U.S., credit rating activities has a history of more than one hundred years, while 
the modern rating agencies as we know today actually started from 1975. In that year, 
the SEC introduced the norm known as the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
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Organization (NRSRO) to regulate the rating institutions. A film which is designated an 
NRSRO means that it is ‘nationally recognized’.69 Until 2010, only eight firms had been 
recognized as NRSROs, however the rating market is mostly monopolized by three of 
them, or especially the former two: Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (Moody’s), Standard 
& Poor’s Financial Services LLC (S&P), and Fitch Ratings Ltd. (Fitch).70 
 
Rating institutions use letter grades to indicate credit levels. An ‘AAA’ (or Aaa) rating 
indicates the safest investments while ‘D’ (or nothing) designates the defaults. According 
to S&P, ratings from AAA to BBB- are the ‘investment grades’, and those below BBB- are 
referred to the investments not recommended.71 
 
CRAs profit by giving analysis and issuing ratings to debts and debts issuers.72 CRAs have 
had a long history rating corporate bonds, as their main business. And that is why the 
data-based approach initiated and developed. However, since the recent years that the 
banks had extended their business distributions, CRAs started to rate many new 
products, like various kinds of securities. The securitization has a short history but the 
CRAs still use the same rating model and the same scale of letter grades. This was widely 
criticized by the investors especially when the financial crisis happened. People say that 
the CRAs mislead the market participates by issuing ratings to the investments that they 
actually know very few about.73 
 
While all the scandals were not realized until the house prices started to fall and a large 
amount of the RMBSs went to default in around 2006-2007. Many investors argued that 
they viewed credit ratings as the key measurement when investing their money, but the 
ratings issued were just overly optimistic. Since billions of dollars’ worth of AAA-referred 
securities turned to default (D) in less than two years, people argued that the CRAs had 
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lost their functions and earned money for no reason. Although it stimulated the CRAs to 
reconsider its rating methods, it was obviously too late.74 
 
 
4.3 Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) 
 
It is a structured asset-backed security which securitizes (or re-securitizes) commercial 
loans, corporate bonds, RMBS and etc. ‘Even tranches of CDOs have been re-securitized 
into CDOs of CDOs’.75 
 
The early CDO was said to have been invented by Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1987.76 
Normally an investment bank packages different kinds of leveraged loans which have 
the cash flows into an asset-backed pool, and then securitizes them. The CDOs refers to 
special purpose vehicle (SPV) that ‘holds assets and issues obligations’.77 After that, 
banks ask the CRAs to rate the CDOs in order to make them marketable. CDOs are 
structured of different tranches of returns, maturities, and risks, which provides 
different choices for investors.78 
 
Usually, CDOs are structured with one of the three grades, senior tranches, mezzanine 
tranches or equity tranches. The senior tranches could have a high credit rating with a 
low risk. The mezzanine ones are rated from AA to BB. Comparing with the senior 
tranches, the mezzanine ones share more risk in the event of default. The last grade 
equity tranches are not rated at all and contain the most risky tranches.79 
 
The structure and the issuing process of the CDOs are complicate, and investment banks 
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are normally not willing to disclose these to the investors. Thereby, most of the investors 
do not clearly know the degree of risk in the CDOs they hold. 
 
 
4.4 Short Selling 
 
Normally, investors would like to get profit from buying low and selling high in the stock 
market and selling a long position is, of course, the mostly means to avoiding the losses 
in a overpriced asset. Short selling, however, is the other means to make money not 
only from the uptick but also from the downtick, which means that selling a short 
position is avoiding the losses as well as making profits from the knowledge of 
overpricing.80 
 
Short selling means to sell a financial instrument which you do not own. It can be 
subdivided into Covered Short Selling and Naked Short Selling.81 The former one is 
typical, that a short seller usually borrows security from a holder; while the latter one 
refers to that without borrowing them. Naked short selling is normally illegal in most of 
the countries, otherwise regulated by a number of rules.82 According to the Risk 
Response Approaches, we consider short selling as a way to share risk among the 
departments. Naked short selling could be to transfer risk. And since a short selling is 
usually combined with the linear long selling or a bundle of short sales in order to 
reduce risk, it can also be analyzed by the Portfolio Theory. Below, we explain the 
concept by the angle of the covered approach. 
 
Short selling is a reversed procedure against long selling. That is to say, a short seller 
complete the whole trade mainly by borrowing other investors’ securities first and 
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selling out when the price on top, then buying back the equal numbers of securities 
which have been sold when the price on bottom and returning to the shares’ owner 
later. The most important reason for short-sellers to do so is that the securities are 
firmly believed it will decline later and the short-sellers will profit from the spread 
between the prices.83 So we can find that there are several roles included during the 
short selling process, we define that the brokers who hold position for large investors 
are lenders and the short-sellers are borrowers. 
 
Once a short-seller wants to short, the first step he/she would do is to identify which 
company is ‘bad’ (also a short selling opportunity) by using some financial 
characteristics. Next, he/she must find someone who would like to lend the shares,84 
normally the brokerage firms who play an important role in the entire transaction. 
 
First of all, the borrower tells the brokerage firm that he wants a certain amount of 
shares, the broker then finds the special securities from the inventory and require 
borrower to pay for the value of the loan in collateral (normally a little higher than the 
market value). If the value rises, the borrower should pay additional collateral. If it 
decreases, the lender will return some of the collateral to the borrower. The brokerage 
firm can use the collateral to invest and make revenue. At the same time, the brokerage 
firm has to pay some fees to the owner of the securities based on agreement.85 Finally, 
the borrower buys back the securities and returns them to the brokerage firm. Then, the 
lender has to return the collateral and some of the interests ‘in the form of a negotiated 
rebate rate’.86 
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(Source: Fabozzi, 2004, p.11) 
 
Short selling has an important influence on dampening excessive market volatility.  
Short-sellers sell the securities when prices are high result in rally of the market and 
dampening the prices increase. On the other hand, they buy back shares and decrease 
the supply of securities which results in cushioning prices decline.87  
 
For short selling, however, it has both advantages and disadvantages. A significant 
advantage to short-sellers is that ‘selling stocks short tend to go down about twice as 
fast as they rise’.88 Meanwhile, a big disadvantage of short selling is that it counteracts 
to the tendency to rise of the market over time. This means when you short, you are 
against most of the traders and the generally rising tide. 
 
 
4.5 Credit Default Swap (CDS) 
 
Simply speaking, a CDS is ‘insurance against the default of an issuer’s bonds and other 
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debt obligations….CDSs were written against RMBS securities and against bonds of 
financial institutions and all other kinds of debt issuers.’89 In another word, CDS is a 
product derived by financial institutions in order to protect the buyer’s profit when the 
obligor fails to pay back the mortgage.90 
 
Normally, a CDS buyer has to pay a periodic premium and sign a contract with the seller 
who ‘guaranteed the referenced security against loss….(and) if the referenced security 
later incurred a loss, the CDS seller had to pay an agreed-upon amount to the CDS buyer 
to cover the loss’.91 In most of the cases that the default rates are low, writing CDSs is a 
quite lucrative business. It has also been considered as a great risk management tool for 
the buyers. As long as the default rates are at a normal level, CDS looks fine for both 
buyers and insurers.92 
 
But since the market grew, CDS had turned to be a pure insurance like life insurance that 
people do not need to meet the event. That is to say, ‘a buyer of a CDS does not need to 
own the underlying security or have any other kind of exposure to it’.93 This had very 
much shifted CDS to be a naked short selling instrument or ‘naked credit default swap’. 
As a result, CDS had become a speculative tool rather than a risk management tool.94 
Some investors purchased a large number of CDS contracts against those securities they 
believed would fail.95 
 
Therefore, CDS was then an approach to transfer risk with regard to the Risk Response 
Approaches – it transfers risks from the owner to a contractor such as the writer of the 
CDS. The speculation market had remarkably grown which brought a hidden danger to 
the final insurer like the AIG, thus led to a systematic risk of the American financial 
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market.96 
 
 
4.6 Summary 
 
Above, we have got five sections under the chapter of analysis, and each of them is of 
unique concern to the following case study and our problem area. The background 
includes the overall description of the financial market development in the U.S., the 
hidden troubles of the investment banks and the subprime related products, and the 
step-by-step causation of the financial crisis. We could understand how investment 
banks emerged and expanded their businesses, why they were not open to the retail 
customers in contrast with the traditional banks, and how the subprime mortgage 
backed assets turned to collapse. 
 
Then, the followed actors or concepts were of important relevance to the subprime 
crisis or intensified it. The CRAs could be responsible for the crisis to a big extent, since 
they far optimized the mortgage market, and the related assets and securities, which 
caused people’s delay in alertness. This could be a remarkable reason that caused the 
tragedy of many individual and institutional investors for instance Lehman Brothers, yet 
on the other side helped the speculators who took advantage of the unrealistic ratings. 
However, CRA is not our main focus in this project and we would not further investigate 
it though it is very relevant to the whole process. 
 
CDO is a financial tool which might be a little hard for us to explain thoroughly. However, 
we could understand that it is an integrated financial tool backed by a bundle of assets 
or securities for instance the subprime RMBS. CDO is an investment instrument issued 
by investment banks. It had helped the housing market as well as the whole economic 
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boom in the early 2000s. However we will also discuss it in the case study that it is 
improperly used by Goldman Sachs to unload risks onto the clients. 
 
Short selling and CDS are considered as a kind of insurance used to hedge risks. During 
the financial crisis, they played an important role for hedge funds and some other 
speculators. Goldman Sachs which we will study as the case might be one of the largest 
speculators who made a lot of money by using short position and CDS. The concepts will 
be involved in this case as well as the discussion from a critical perspective. 
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5. Case Study 
 
 
In this chapter, we will look at two big investment banks Lehman Brothers and Goldman 
Sachs in America, and analyze them as the cases. We tend to explain and compare their 
different strategies counteracting to the subprime crisis impact. 
 
 
5.1 Lehman Brothers 
 
‘Henry Lehman an immigrant from Germany was born in 1821 immigrated to Alabama 
and set up a general-merchandise store in Montgomery in 1845’.97 In 1850, Henry and 
his brothers Emanuel and Mayer founded Lehman Brothers which at that time was a 
cotton trading company.98 In 1870, Lehman Brothers got involved in New York Cotton 
Exchange Foundation, and later in 1883 they had entered a coffee market and became a 
member of the coffee exchange. In 1887 Lehman Brothers turned into a New York Stock 
Exchange member.99 
 
After 1900, Lehman Brothers started paying attention to investment banking business. 
‘Their investment banking business provided financial services such as mergers and 
acquisitions, underwritings and issuing securities. In other business lines, the equity part 
of Lehman invested in equity around the world while the fixed income, capital markets 
and investment management parts concerned various services and wealth 
management.’100 
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During its history, the company had survived plenty of challenges, such as the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, the World Wars, the 11.9.2001 Attack and etc.101 However the 
collapse of the U.S. housing market destroyed the Lehman Brothers in their over the 
head rush into the subprime mortgage market. The main point of that kind of lending is 
mainly associated with a conviction from the lenders point of view that it did not matter 
if a borrower has an ability to pay off the mortgage debt. None of it mattered as long as 
the home prices keep rising and a disturbed borrower could either refinance or pay off 
their mortgage by selling their house. Later the subprime mortgage investment turned 
into a bad one that the house prices began to decline. Most of the homeowners 
defaulted to pay, and the lenders lost a lot of money as well as the investors who 
purchased mortgage-backed securities. 
 
1.  What is the portfolio composition within Lehman Brothers? 
 
The great housing boom begins to shrink in the fall of 2005. By late 2006 the market 
started to sink, where at first prices began to drop slowly and later with mounting speed. 
‘As soon as the prices start falling down instead of rising, and houses became hard to sell, 
default rates began rising. As a result a risk of foreclosure became not just a tragedy for 
the homeowners but a lousy deal for lenders.’102 According to the portfolio theory there 
is always a risk factor associated within a portfolio of shares, where unsystematic risk is 
reduced through diversification and systematic risk is associated with economic growth 
movements, inflation and exchange rate changes.103 In this case it was a result of 
systematic risk which was common to all firms. ‘The systematic risk is sometimes 
reserved for events that trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in substantial 
portion of the financial system that is serious enough to have significant potential 
effects on a country’s real economy.’104 The portfolio composition within Lehman 
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Brothers was greatly associated with systematic risk within the subprime mortgage 
deals. 
 
Lehman Brothers was involved in subprime loans and mortgages. Those loans had been 
considered financially risky, and were issued without or with little securities where they 
had a higher degree of interest rates. Lehman Brothers made huge profits from 
subprime loans as long as credit defaults were at normal rates.105 Banks were not 
scared to lend money to subprime borrowers, because in the event of default, the 
insurance would pay them back. ‘However making money from selling the CDO 
insurance for the bank depends on whether the borrowers return the money, which in 
return depends on the economy.’106 If economy goes down there is a great chance of 
losing your money. 
 
‘Given the growing complexity and interconnectivity of the global financial system, it is a 
daunting task to expect to arrive at a single measure of systematic risk associated with 
financial crises’107. It is difficult to ascertain and measure the degree of systematic risk 
within the Lehman Brothers. 
 
2. What are the specific risks regarding the central element in Lehman Brothers? 
 
The stability in economy is driven with a higher risk taking resulting in bigger profits. 
Lehman Brothers became wide-open toward extremely high risks taking and made 
record profits annually. The first systematic risk was exposed instantly. ‘The failure of 
just one bank caused a knock on effect across the world, highlighting the extent of 
which the global financial system was truly entwined.’108 In the overview of the 
subprime risk chapter it was mentioned about risks associated with subprime which 
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were credit risk, market risk, operational risk etc. Based on this, Lehman Brothers also 
identified five specific risks inherent in their business before the crisis. 
 
The first one was market risk, where because of the changes in market rates, prices and 
volatilities there was always a potential unfavorable change in the value of portfolio.109 
‘The credit market uncertainty grew which meant increased loan costs on the whole 
market, a so-called credit crunch.’ Lehman Brothers got stuck with assets they could not 
sell, the ones that got decreased in market value’.110 
 
The second one was credit risk resulted from the security originators who were unable 
to honor its contractual obligations to Lehman Brothers. They had made large profits 
with subprime loans as long as credit defaults were at normal rates.111 
 
The third one referred to liquidity risk where the Lehman Brothers could not sell their 
mortgage products since nobody was willing to buy, to fund actual or proposed 
commitments or to liquidate assets. ‘When interest rates started to climb an increasing 
number of obligators started to default which meant a significant loss in revenues and a 
severe increase in liquidity risk’.112 
 
The fourth one was operational risk which refers to the failed internal processes like 
systems or improper actions taken.113 ‘The market did not believe in Lehman brothers 
and the firm became unable to borrow enough money for their daily operations’.114 
 
The fifth one – reputational risk was associated with customers’ distrust on the company, 
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which resulted in a loss of clients and government support.115 ‘Lenders and other 
independent parties successively lost confidence in the bank which lead to increasing 
capital costs and difficulties in getting short-term funding to maintain liquidity.’116 
 
There were five risks indicating Lehman Brothers. Market risk resulted in Lehman 
Brothers’ inability to sell their assets that got decreased in value. Credit risk resulted in 
splitting and mixing tiny loans to even out credit risk. Loans were risky, but rated to be 
safe. Lenders wanted to know what risk they took by loaning money. Liquidity risk 
resulted in higher interest rates which in return created evasion of obligators. 
Operational risk resulted in insufficient procedures, improper actions taken and market 
disbelieve. Reputational risk, due to irresponsible behavior, resulted in the awareness 
among customers, and the government’s loss of confidence in the bank.117 
 
3. What are the risk management strategies within Lehman Brothers? 
 
There are three types of key players involved in risk management: systemic players (legal 
and regulatory authorities), institutional players (shareholders, board of directors, 
executive management, and audit committee), and external players (external auditors, 
outside stakeholders, public).118 Every one of them is important in relation to Lehman 
Brothers. However we will be more focusing towards risk management strategies within 
the company. 
 
According to our theory in risk management and the strategies in reducing risks, Lehman 
Brothers had chosen to retain risk unfortunately, which basically means that they had 
chosen to accept the risk, since it’s too large to transfer or reduce the event.119 When 
analyzing Lehman Brothers it was surely understood that they were keen towards more 
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risky deals, basically exceeding their risk policies, the only explanation to this fact was 
the compensation system. ‘In order to attract and keep the sharpest minds in the 
industry, investment banks normally rewarded their most revenue generating 
employees with big monetary bonuses’.120 Basically investment is a trade off between 
risk and potential profit, the higher the risk the bigger the profit. ‘In the case of Lehman 
Brothers, the staff and management made a fortune during the good years when the 
firm made record profits, profits that were possible due to a high risk taking with high 
leverage and exposure to then profitable loaning and real estate affairs.’121 The rational 
behaviour theory can also explain Lehman’s failure in using compensations. Since 
individual employee concerned their own bonus without regarding the total risk level 
taken by the whole company, the management irrationally did the same. 
 
‘The strength of a risk management department is its ability to accurately report on risk 
and be heard, and then Lehman risk management department was a complete 
failure…Lehman failed to monitor other equally important risks - liquidity, availability of 
funding, operational costs, and the like hood of credit default. It is indicated that the 
top-level management refused to head such warnings and continued to bet on real 
estate market, in particular, would continue generating booming profits’.122 
 
Lehman Brothers was actually risking billions of dollars in an attempt to make more 
billions. The risk interrelated with Mortgage Backed Securities, that had been ignored 
because of the top executives thought that it will reduce the profits too much. Same as 
its risk management department which had failed to counteract risks associated with 
subprime mortgage. The main idea of the department was ignoring the risks factor – 
taking higher risk and making more profit. 
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5.2 Goldman Sachs 
 
Like Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs is another famous investment bank in America. It 
was established in 1869 as a private partnership, and in 1999 became a publicly traded 
corporation. It is now a bank holding company, located at the Wall Street in New York 
City.123 Goldman Sachs does not have retail banking operations, so to speak, the 
company ‘does not accept deposits from, nor lend to, retail customers, nor does its 
broker-dealer provide advice to or execute trades on behalf of retail customers’.124 
Instead, the company only provides services to institutional investors, such as ‘large 
corporations, financial services firms, pension funds, hedge funds, and a few very 
wealthy individuals’.125 
 
During the latest years, Goldman Sachs has extended its business areas according to the 
development of the financial market and derivatives. For instance, the company 
primarily trades houses, provides broker-dealer services to institutional customers and 
hedge funds. Now the company can normally invest by using its own capital and for its 
own benefit, which probably explains the company’s activities in the years ahead of the 
financial crisis.126 
 
Goldman Sachs’ business activities can be divided into three segments: ‘Investment 
Banking, Trading and Principal Investments, and Asset Management and Securities 
Services’.127 The Trading and Principal Investments Segment includes three kinds of 
businesses: ‘Fixed Income, Currency and Commodities (FICC); Equities; and Principal 
Investments’.128 The Mortgage business which is under the FICC deals with securities 
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underwriting, proprietary trading in loans, securities, and other mortgage backed 
products. In the years leading up to the financial crisis, the Mortgage Department was 
principally responsible for the mortgage backed assets and the mortgage backed 
securities.129 The Mortgage Department includes several desks, one of which is an 
important emphasis in the analysis – the CDO Origination Desk. We would like to take 
this aspect to explain the company’s risk management strategy – the CDO related 
activities as well as the use of CDS and short position. 
 
Unlike other departments that reported big losses, Goldman’s mortgage business 
generated large profits in 2006 and 2007. The Mortgage Department contributed the 
company which as a result had only one quarter of losses during the crisis years.130 
 
Goldman’s Risk Hedge 
 
Similar with Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs ‘had also helped to build an active 
mortgage market in the U.S. and had accumulated a huge portfolio of mortgage related 
products’ before the financial crisis years.131 However, the company seemed to nose the 
subprime crisis and since the late 2006 started to reverse the strategies. In contrast to 
Lehman Brothers who chose to retain more risks, Goldman’s dealing with the subprime 
risks was totally opposite which could be concluded primarily in two activities. The first 
and the most important one was to hedge risk by shorting the subprime mortgage 
assets they had while profiting from the devaluation of the related products and 
securities; the other one was to create mortgage backed CDOs to ‘unload the risk 
associated with its high risk mortgage assets onto clients’.132 According to the Risk 
Response Approaches, Goldman’s activities could be understood as a combined use of 
mitigating, avoiding, transferring and sharing risks. The two activities were very much 
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associated; so to speak, the company built and sold the CDOs at the same time shorted 
the referred assets or securities which backed the CDOs. Since we have introduced short 
selling, it is not hard to understand how it works. Goldman’s shorting operations 
included both the covered short selling by ‘shorting the assets themselves’ and naked 
short selling by using CDS contracts typically.133 
 
In the mid 2006, the company realized that the confidence on the subprime mortgage 
market would decrease. They began to take actions to unload their risky assets. Firstly, 
the company bound their own mortgage backed securities and designed synthetic CDOs 
in order to ‘sell’ the risks to clients. In October 2006, Goldman issued a CDO called 
‘Hudson Mezzanine 2006-1’ which included more than $2 billion on CDS contracts to 
offset risks associated with Goldman’s own inventory of subprime (residential) mortgage 
backed securities they wanted to short.134 Goldman took short position and bought CDS 
contracts to hedge the mortgage assets both those were sold out and those were not. 
The synthetic CDOs included assets of different credit ratings even the AAA rated 
subprime residential loans at that time, however which also turned to junk level in a 
short period.135 
 
The ‘Hudson Mezzanine 2006-1’ CDO was named with ‘mezzanine’, because the most 
referenced RMBSs were rated with BBB or BBB-.136 These were the very risky loans 
which could tend to default. While Goldman marketing the Hudson securities, they at 
the same time took 100% short position of the $2 billion assets but they did not disclose 
this to the investors.137 The same thing happened to the later generated CDOs named 
‘Anderson Mezzanine 2007-1’, ‘Timberwolf I CDO’, ‘Abacus 2007-AC1’ and etc. which all 
contained a bundle of poor assets and began to lose value as soon as being issued.138 
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Moreover, among these CDO instruments the ‘Abacus 2007-AC1’ was originated in 
response to a request by Paulson Hedge Fund. Paulson was one of Goldman’s largest 
customers for subprime mortgage related assets who had a very negative view of the 
mortgage market. When Paulson asked for the assistance in structuring a portfolio of 
subprime mortgage assets which were with the likelihood to perform poorly, Goldman 
allowed him to use the Abacus CDO.139 Whereas, Goldman did not disclose to the 
public the role of Paulson in the selection process and its totally adverse purposes 
against most of the long position investors. Paulson used the self-established criteria to 
select the poor quality assets in the Abacus CDO, then shorted them and made 
remarkable profits. When the long position investors of the Abacus CDO lost most of 
their money, Paulson recorded a profit of about $1 billion.140 In spite of the profits 
made by the shorts, Goldman also got billions of dollars’ bailout from the Fed, as well as 
other indirect government support.141 
 
Goldman’s shorting and CDO activities were widely criticized since they were realized by 
the public. Many people considered it as fraud, since Goldman cheated most of the 
small investors while got government bailout from at root the taxpayers which were also 
their victims, and just doing a favor to the few big clients and themselves. Later in April 
2010 the SEC accused Goldman Sachs of fraud for the reason that they did not by 
regulation disclose Paulson’s role in the CDO construction which in fact influenced the 
selection of the assets and the securities involved.142 
 
 
5.3 Summary 
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Through the analysis of the investment portfolio, the risk components, and the risk 
management approaches of the two companies, we may see that one of them 
successfully crossed the risks while the other one had to fail for bankruptcy. It is 
interesting to ask why the risk management behaviours of the two actors were 
completely different. No doubt the financial crisis factor played its role; however they 
handled risks differently, yet big profits brought the same motivation behind as both of 
their initial stimulation. 
 
We believe that Lehman brothers failed in their risk management, since they without 
limitation intended to take higher risk and make more profits where management 
department chose to ignore the risk factors. The managers of Lehman Brothers 
underestimated the level of people’s rationality. Goldman Sachs however chose another 
direction, identifying risks and transferring them onto other blinded investors. They 
seemed have controlled the game, however if taking a point of view of business ethics 
or Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) for instance, we may not curtly uphold their 
ways of dealing with risks. They satisfied their own rationality, but failed in balancing 
benefits among their clients. 
 
 Lehman Brothers Goldman Sachs 
Role in subprime market 
before the crisis 
important; active player important; active player 
Risk management 
activities 
few effective activities; 
neglecting and ignoring 
to sell risks to clients by CDOs; 
short selling and CDS 
Purposes to retain risks and gain 
market shares 
to unload risks and profit by risks 
Results bankruptcy profiteer 
Evaluations bullheaded and unwary speculative and fraudulent 
 
 
There were also other factors which contributed to the crisis. The role of CRAs for 
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instance was quite incorrect since the ratings were over-estimated too much. This 
resulted in the misjudgment of investors which was taken as advantage by Goldman 
Sachs to profit on with fraudulent means. The natural conflict like the issuer-pays model 
in the rating process was finally paid attention to however a little late since the tragedy 
had started. We believe that ratings should be issued more accurately and objectively 
for investors, since it is an important risk management tool. 
 
Moreover, the use of short position and CDS was another critical paradox which hedged 
and intensified risks at the same time. They helped to hedge risks for the user, but 
brought more risks to other investors and the whole system. When the people who use 
short selling or CDS are still the minority, the system can suffer. However, ‘simple and 
kind’ people would change to be rational if there are always no sufficient regulations. 
Therefore, we consider short position and CDS as more likely speculative tools than risk 
management tools since they merely transfer risk to other parties rather than avoid or 
mitigate it. In the extreme case, a CDS writer would have to bear all the risks, which 
spreads the risks back to the whole system. In this situation, all unsystematic risks are 
transformed to systematic risks which can no longer be solved by any single investor or 
institution. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
 
To review and conclude our project, we have the motivation to investigate risk 
management in financial institutions in America, with regard to the financial crisis. Since 
financial institutions are too big in range, we narrow down to investment banks and 
draw our interests in Lehman Brothers and Goldman Sachs as the cases being analyzed. 
The reason we pick these two companies is that they encountered totally opposite 
destinies in the financial crisis. Therefore, we have initiated our problem formulation to 
investigate, in the same contemporary and environment, how risk management 
strategies could make a difference to the companies in the same industry, and how 
investment banks may, if possible, manage risks more accurately to counteract financial 
crisis impact. 
 
Based on our studies, we would like to say that the extent to which investment banks as 
well as other financial institutions in America could manage risks by themselves was 
quite moderate. First, the importance of risk management was undervalued because of 
people’s rationality on money. Usually, people tended to be blinded in front of the 
expected benefits. Second, even though investors were trying to estimate risks, they 
were still blinded because of the systematic drawbacks. Credit rating for instance was an 
important index investors looked at when making investment decisions. However, the 
ratings were issued too optimistically that had misguided many people. In addition, the 
excessive use of short selling and CDS drove down the market confidence, which 
resulted in the depreciation of the financial derivatives. Thus, these also indicate the 
lack of the government functions which failed to regulate the macro-economy tendency 
such as the interest rates adjustment, and to supervise the market behaviours such as 
the rating process and the CDO construction etc.  
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Consequently, it is doubtful to measure to what degree a single investor or institution 
can implement risk management methods and do make any effect for sure; since in the 
modern financial market, every institution or function is interconnected with each other. 
No one can just be sure to keep their nose clean. Without effective orders and 
restrictions, one’s operation may change a portion of market habits and everyone’s 
operations interrelated would probably crush the system. 
 
Further Research 
 
After we have written this project, we think about what aspects occurred in the process 
could be interesting to investigate further. Given the complexity of theoretical and 
empirical data, we believe it would be very interesting to look at subject from different 
angles such as the investment bank’s social responsibility (CSR), the government 
intervention in macro-economy or the CRA’s roles. 
 
We believe that this project has its significance in the way it creates the problem area, 
and offers a point of departure for further investigation. We are aware that the project 
only gives a limited insight to the research area, but it also illustrates some interesting 
points. Yet, the problem is far from being entirely investigated. 
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